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Abstract Wage inequality declined in the 1990s, while it increased in the 2000s for full-
time male workers in Japan. We find that a decreased return to firm-specific human capital,
which has been neglected in previous empirical analyses of inequality, is a key factor pre-
venting a rise in wage inequality during the prolonged period of economic stagnation,
known as Japan’s lost decades. We also find that, while changes in returns to general and
specific human capital contributed to narrowing wage inequality in the 1990s and widening
wage inequality in the 2000s, a significant fraction of the increase in wage inequality in the
2000s is attributable to composition effects arising from an increased share of educated and
experienced workers, among whom wages are more dispersed.
Keywords Wage inequality · Firm-specific human capital · Heterogeneous returns ·
Seniority wages · Composition effects
1 Introduction
Various measures of wage inequality did not rise substantially in Japan over the 1980s and
1990s, whereas a sizable increase in wage inequality has taken place in other advanced
industrialized nations since the 1980s (see [23, 24, 26, 37] for Japan and [1, 4, 21, 25, 31] for
the United States). Looking at the variance of log wages for full-time male workers between
the ages of 15 and 59 in Japan, wage inequality declined in the 1990s, while it increased
in the 2000s. The aim of this paper is to account for the trends in wage inequality for the
prolonged period of economic stagnation, known as Japan’s lost decades.
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Total factor productivity is a key factor that accounts for the depression of the 1990s in
Japan relative to the United States as well as for the miraculous economic growth from the
1960s to the early 1970s in Japan [19, 39]. Interestingly, this is precisely the period of high
economic growth when Japanese employment practices were established as an effective
way to foster a highly-skilled workforce within firms [28]. Consequently, around 1980,
job tenure was longer, job turnover was less frequent, and the earnings-tenure profile was
steeper for male workers in Japan than for their counterparts in the United States [16]. The
higher return to tenure (seniority) in Japan is thus attributable to greater on-the-job training
that Japanese firms provided to keep up with rapid technological progress [36]. The return
to tenure declined in Japan from the early l970s to the mid-1980s [6], a period when the
growth rate of total factor productivity fell [19], while it increased in the second half of
the 1980s [17], a period when the growth rate of total factor productivity rose [19]. These
studies provide evidence that the growth rate of total factor productivity was positively
associated with the return to tenure in the 1970s and the 1980s and that the growth rate of
total factor productivity fell in the 1990s. In light of this evidence, the return to tenure might
have declined in the 1990s. In this paper, we document changes in the return to tenure and
examine their implications for inequality trends over the 1990s and 2000s.
We consider a change in the return to tenure as a possible cause that prevents a rise in
wage inequality in Japan. Although firm-specific human capital is widely recognized as a
key determinant of wages [3, 9], the role of firm-specific human capital has been largely
neglected in previous empirical analyses of inequality.1 Firm-specific human capital is an
essential element of the Japanese labor market, which previous literature has characterized
as having long-term employment and seniority wages. There might have been a change in
the importance of firm-specific human capital, however, as technological progress slowed
in the 1990s. We would expect that firms provided less on-the-job training in the waves of
economic downturn, and consequently, the return to tenure decreased. Indeed, we find that
a decreased return to tenure accounts for a large part of the decline in wage inequality in
the 1990s and continued to prevent a rise in wage inequality in the 2000s. These findings
deserve attention for two reasons. First, the findings suggest an alternative explanation for
international differences in trends in wage inequality. Theoretically, an increased return to
tenure because of accelerated technological progress could account for a part of rising wage
inequality in the United States [42]. International differences in inequality trends thus can be
attributed, at least in part, to differences in changes in the importance of firm-specific human
capital associated with differences in the speed and timing of technological change. Second,
the findings indicate that the erosion of Japan’s seniority wages has a strong influence on
inequality trends, a result that has not been previously documented. This paper shows that a
change in the return to tenure had a major impact on the trends in Japan’s wage inequality,
while a change in the length of tenure did not.
We extend the empirical analyses of Japan’s wage structure conducted in previous stud-
ies, including a recent study by Kambayashi et al. [23], as follows. First, we update changes
in wage inequality with more recent micro data up to 2008. The aforementioned study does
1None of the studies cited above empirically examines the effects of changes in the return to tenure or the
length of tenure on wage inequality. Genda [11] estimate the contribution of these changes to mean wage
differentials between specific age and education groups from 1980 to 1992. Kambayashi et al. [23] and
Lacuesta and Izquierdo [29] take job tenure into account as one of the determinants of wages, but they do not
provide the detailed decomposition.
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not cover the period after 2003, when wage inequality increased more clearly. We uncover
two countervailing trends throughout the 1991–2009 period. The reversal of the trends in
overall inequality occurred when an increase in within-group inequality exceeded a decline
in between-group inequality. Second, we provide details on changes in wage profiles with
respect to education, work experience, and job tenure that underlie changes in the wage
structure, using the quantile regression approach. Following Hashimoto’s [14, 15] human
capital theory, we also estimate the bonus-ratio profile and show that, while seniority wages
firmly remain in Japan’s wage structure, the importance of firm-specific human capital
diminished. Finally, we estimate the extent of heterogeneity in returns to general and spe-
cific human capital and decompose changes in between- and within-group inequality into
the portion attributable to the change in the price of skill components (returns to education,
experience, and tenure) and the portion attributable to the change in workforce composi-
tion. The former are referred to as price effects, and the latter as composition effects [31,
32]. Price effects reflect changes in the wage structure that could be induced by skill-biased
technological change, globalization, and supply shifts, while composition effects capture
mechanical changes directly induced by changes in demographic structure. When, for exam-
ple, the returns to education and experience are heterogeneous, wages are more dispersed
among more educated and experienced workers, and thus, an increased share of educated
and experienced workers can mechanically raise wage inequality. The Japanese labor market
is an interesting case, because it has been influenced by technological advances, global-
ization, and continuous progress in higher education and aging over the past few decades.
Indeed, we show that a significant fraction of the increase in within-group inequality in the
2000s is attributable to composition effects arising from an increased share of educated and
experienced workers, while the decline in between-group inequality in the 1990s is largely
attributable to a decreased return to tenure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the method to
measure the quantitative contribution of changes in returns on three components of human
capital and the composition of the workforce to the trends in between- and within-group
inequality. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and provide a preliminary analysis of changes
in Japan’s wage structure since the 1990s. Section 5 presents results regarding heteroge-
neous returns to human capital and the detailed decomposition of wage inequality. The final
section offers a conclusion.
2 Decomposition method
We begin our analysis by specifying a human-capital pricing equation. We present the
method to decompose wage inequality into inequality between and within skill groups and,
further, decompose between- and within-group inequality into price and composition effects
to understand the sources of inequality.
2.1 Human capital model with heterogeneous returns
We consider the augmented Mincer-type wage equation with random coefficients:
wit = αit + sitβit + xitγit + zit δit , (1)
where wit is the logarithm of hourly wages for individual i in year t , s is a vector of edu-
cation dummies, x is a vector of polynomials of degree four in potential work experience
(age minus the number of years of education minus six), z is a vector of polynomials of
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degree four in job tenure (the length of time with the current employer),2 and both the
intercept and slope coefficients can vary across individuals and over time. We use years
of education, potential experience, and job tenure as measures of general and specific
human capital, as in [6, 16, 17, 36], while we allow for more heterogeneity and nonlinear-
ity in the effects of these components of human capital on wages. Human capital attributes
(s, x, z) are closely related by construction, but each of them has sufficient independent
variation.3 The number of years of experience is not equal to job tenure for more than
three-fourths of workers in the sample used in the analysis. For the purpose of estimation,
we make assumptions on the vector of random coefficients, such that αit = αt + αtai ,
βit = βt + βtbi , γit = γt + γtci , and δit = δt + δtdi with Et( ji | sit , xit , zit ) = 0, and
Vt( ji | sit , xit , zit ) = σ 2j , Et( jiki | sit , xit , zit ) = σij for j, k = a, b, c, d , and j = k.
While we restrict the variances and covariances of returns to be time-invariant, we allow the
means of returns to vary over time. Our model is an extension of the human-capital pricing
equation in Lemieux [31] that incorporates firm-specific human capital and allows returns
to human capital to be correlated.
Under the assumptions mentioned above, the log wage equation (1) can be rewritten as
wit = αt + sitβt + xitγt + zit δt + uit , (2)
where the error term is uit = αtai + sitβtbi + xitγt ci + zit δtdi . The slope coefficients in
Eq. 2 represent the mean returns to human capital in year t , i.e., βt = Et(βit ), γt = Et(γit ),
and δt = Et(δit ). The decomposition analysis is concerned more with changes in returns
to human capital, such as δt ′ − δt for t = t ′, than with levels. Even in the presence of
endogeneity, the estimate of the change in the return to tenure will be unbiased if the size
of the bias is unchanged between the two years.4 In fact, the proportion of male full-time
workers whose number of years of experience is equal to job tenure was almost unchanged
during the sample period, ranging from 22 % to 23 %, which is indicative of no substantial
change in the size of the potential bias due to selection. The augmented wage equation fits
the data remarkably well. The three elements of human capital (s, x, z) account for one
half of the variation in wages for full-time male workers in Japan. 5
The variance of log wages can be decomposed into two components.
Vt(wit ) = Vt[Et(wit | sit , xit , zit )] + Et[Vt(wit | sit , xit , zit )] , (3)
where the first component represents the variance of log wages between skill groups, and
the second component represents the variance of log wages within skill groups. Skill groups
are defined using years of education (categorized as 9, 12, 14, and 16+), experience (ranging
from 0 to 44), and tenure (ranging from 0 to 44), in a manner consistent with Eq. 2.6
2More higher-order terms are not included to avoid perfect multicollinearity.
3The correlation coefficients are only –0.38 between education and experience, –0.14 between education and
tenure, and 0.64 between experience and tenure in the sample used in the analysis.
4Topel [41] develops a method to reduce the bias in the estimate of δ using panel data, under the assumption
that δit = δ for all i and t . See [2, 9] for surveys and assessment of studies on the return to tenure in the
United States.
5The R2 obtained from the log wage regressions by year ranges from 0.47 to 0.56 during the sample period.
6The yearly total number of skill groups is approximately 3,850, and the yearly median group size is
approximately 200 in the sample used in the analysis. In practice, however, we calculate the between- and
within-group variance by estimating Eq. 2 on the full sample.
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2.2 The detailed decomposition
We aim to explain changes in between- and within-group inequality in terms of changes
in returns to human capital and the composition of the workforce using the human-capital
pricing Eq. 2. For this purpose, we fully make use of the structure of human-capital pricing
equation and estimate heterogeneous returns to human capital in terms of means, variances,
and covariances.7 In doing so, we are able to give a simple and transparent interpreta-
tion of the results with a small number of key statistics and improve the precision of
estimates.
Specifically, we consider the following conditional mean and variance derived from the
specifications of log wage Eq. 2:
Et(wit | sit , xit , zit ) = αt + sitβt + xitγt + zit δt , (4)
Vt(wit | sit , xit , zit ) = σ 2a α2t + σ 2b (sitβt )2 + σ 2c (xitγt )2 + σ 2d (zit δt )2
+σab (2αt · sitβt ) + σac (2αt · xitγt ) + σad (2αt · zitδt )
+σbc (2sitβt · xitγt )+σbd (2sitβt · zit δt )+σcd (2xitγt ·zit δt ). (5)
Equation 4 relates between-group inequality to the price of skill and the composition of the
workforce, while Eq. 5 relates within-group inequality to the price of skill and the compo-
sition of the workforce. The human-capital pricing equation in Lemieux [31] is nested as a
special case when δt = 0 and σij = 0 for j, k = a, b, c, d , and j = k.
Since we allow returns to human capital to vary across individuals, a change in the
price of skill can affect not only between- but also within-group inequality. If there is no
heterogeneity in returns to human capital, i.e., σ 2j = σij = 0, between-group inequality
increases with the price of skill, while within-group inequality does not change accord-
ing to the price of skill. For the case when σ 2j = 0 and σij = 0, however, within-group
inequality also increases with the price of skill, and the size of price effects on within-group
inequality is proportional to the extent of heterogeneity in returns to human capital, as can
be seen from Eq. 5. In the more general case, when σ 2j = 0 and σij = 0, price effects on
within-group inequality depend on the sign and size of covariance, as well as the size of
the variance of returns to human capital. Suppose that returns to general human capital are
negatively correlated with returns to firm-specific human capital. A decline in the return
to experience entails an increase in the return to tenure; thus, it will not necessarily lower
within-group inequality. Similarly, an increase in the return to education will not necessar-
ily raise within-group inequality. Therefore, ignoring the interaction effect can potentially
cause a substantial bias in estimating price effects on within-group inequality.
The mean returns to human capital are identified from Eq. 4, and the variance and
covariance of returns to human capital are identified from Eq. 5. Since a set of parameters
representing returns to human capital (αt , βt , γt , δt ) appears in both equations, we estimate
the system of equations jointly by the generalized method of moments (GMM) to improve
efficiency. The moment conditions (4) and (5) can be expressed as
Et( uit | sit , xit , zit ) = 0,
Et
(
u2it − Vt (wit | sit , xit , zit )
∣∣∣ sit , xit , zit
)
= 0.
7See [10] for alternative decomposition methods.
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These conditional moment conditions imply a number of unconditional moment conditions.
Although no excluded instrument is used for estimating Eq. 4, year dummies interacted with
lp and l · m for p = 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and l = m, where l and m represent education, experience,
and tenure, are used as instruments for estimating Eq. 5. We adopt the efficient two-step
GMM and use the data from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) in the years 1991,
2000, and 2008 to account for the reversal of trends in wage inequality.8
An advantage of this approach is that it enables us to isolate the impact of changes
in returns on each component of human capital on between- and within-group inequal-
ity. After estimating a set of parameters
(
αt , βt , γt , δt , σ
2
j , σjk
)
for t = 1991,2000,2008,
j, k = a, b, c, d , and j = k, we can measure the impact of changes in returns to education,
experience, and tenure on changes in between- and within-group inequality from 1991 to
2000 (from 2000 to 2008) by comparing the counterfactual wages in the year 2000 (2008) if
there has been no change in the returns to education, experience, and tenure since the base
year 1991 (2000) to the actual wages in the year 2000 (2008). The counterfactual wages
can be obtained by replacing the estimated coefficients of education, experience, and tenure
with those at the base-year level. Price effects can then be calculated from the sum of the
three effects. Composition effects can be finally calculated as the residual of total predicted
changes in between- and within-group inequality. Equations 4 and 5 are used to quantify the
impact on between- and within-group inequality, respectively.9 The limitation of a decom-
position analysis of this sort is that we are unable to quantify the general equilibrium effects
of changes in the skill distribution.
3 Data
We use repeated cross sections from the BSWS between 1991 and 2008. The BSWS covers
all private establishments with five or more regular employees and public establishments
with 10 or more regular employees, except those classified in agriculture, forestry, fishery,
and the legislative, administrative, and judicial branches of local and national governments.
Following previous studies of Japanese employment practices, we focus on full-time male
workers aged 15 to 59, who are the workers that have the capacity to achieve a long-term
employment relationship.10 We exclude those aged 60 and older, since the mandatory retire-
ment age is typically 60. We extract their information from payroll records from more than
51,000 establishments for every year. The yearly sample size ranges between 577,000 and
834,000. Board members are not included in the sample, but otherwise there is neither top-
nor bottom-coding. We weight all observations by the sampling weight. Hourly wages are
calculated by dividing monthly regular earnings plus one-twelfth of the annual bonus by
monthly hours of work and normalized by the consumer price index with the base year
8The main results described below remain unchanged when using BSWS data from the years 1992, 2000,
and 2007 and the years 1993, 2000, and 2006.
9In general, the decomposition results depend on the choice of base year. The results obtained here remain
essentially unchanged, however, even if price and composition effects on between- and within-group inequal-
ity between 1991 and 2000 (between 2000 and 2008) are calculated by comparing the counterfactual wages
in the year 1991 (2000) when returns to human capital were at the 2000 (2008) level to the actual wages in
the year 1991 (2000).
10See [34] for an analysis of inequality for male and female workers aged 25 to 59, including those who work
part-time.
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of 2005. Regular earnings comprise scheduled earnings, overtime allowance, commuta-
tion allowance, family allowance, and perfect-attendance allowance. Hours of work include
scheduled hours of work and overtime work. Education is categorized into junior-high
school, high school, two-year college (including vocational school), and four-year college
and beyond.
Among new hires, the share of four-year college graduates rose from 31.7 % to 55.5 %,
while the share of high-school graduates fell from 48.5 % to 33.6 % during the sample
period. The starting wage differentials between new college graduates and new high-school
graduates were stable, ranging from 1.25 to 1.28. During the 1991–2008 period, the sample
means of the number of years of potential experience range from 19.6 to 20.6, and the sam-
ple means of job tenure range from 12.1 to 13.1. We elaborate changes in the composition
of the workforce in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4 Changes in Japan’s wage structure
In this section, we present a preliminary analysis of changes in Japan’s wage structure since
the 1990s. We first document changes in wage inequality over the 1990s and 2000s. We then
provide details on changes in wage profiles and within-group inequality and relate them
to changes in the supply and demand of skills and the seniority-based wage system. We
finally examine whether some other features of Japanese employment practices are relevant
to changes in wage profiles and within-group inequality.
4.1 Trends in inequality between and within groups
Figure 1 illustrates trends in overall, between-group, and within-group inequality. Over-
all inequality declined in the 1990s, while it increased in the 2000s. This reversal of the
.05
.1
.15
.2
.25
1991 1995 2000 2005 2008
Overall Between groups Within groups
Fig. 1 Trends in the variance of log wages
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trends occurs by a change in the relative magnitude of two countervailing trends. Pre-
cisely, between-group inequality declined over the 1990s and then fluctuated after 2000,
while within-group inequality stayed nearly constant in the early 1990s and increased after
the mid-1990s. Narrowing inequality in the 1990s reflects a decline in between-group
inequality, while widening inequality in the 2000s reflects an increase in within-group
inequality. These results remain unchanged even after adding the full interaction terms
among education, experience, and tenure.
4.2 Changes in wage profiles
We next document changes in the shape of the wage profiles that underlie changes in wage
inequality, using the quantile regression approach. In doing so, we can also describe the
heterogeneity in returns to human capital for any given year. Let Q(sit , xit , zit , τ) denote
the conditional τ -quantile of log wages, w, given human capital attributes (s, x, z), where
τ ∈ (0, 1). We estimate the standard quantile regression model:
Q(sit , xit , zit , τ) = αt (τ) + sitβt (τ) + xitγt (τ) + zit δt (τ) (6)
wit = Q(sit , xit , zit , uit ) ,
where uit | sit , xit , zit ∼ uniform(0, 1), and the variables (wit , sit , xit , zit ) are defined in
the same manner as in Section 2.
Figure 2 depicts predicted values of log hourly wages along with years of education,
experience, and tenure in 1991, 2000, and 2008, holding other attributes at their means.
−.5
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Fig. 2 Predicted profiles of log wages: 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
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Each wage profile is obtained from the quantile regression estimation of Eq. 6 for τ = 0.1,
0.5, and 0.9. Figure 3 illustrates changes in the workforce share by education, experi-
ence, and tenure to see the shifts in the supply of skills that would affect changes in wage
profiles.
4.2.1 Education
The wage-education profile is approximately linear at the lower quantile but is more convex-
shaped for the upper quantile in recent years. Convexification of the wage-education profile
implies a relative increase in the demand for workers with college degrees. The extent to
which the wage-education profile is convexified, however, is far less prominent for every
quantile in Japan than in the United States [32].11 The relatively stable return to education
in Japan can be explained by a rise in the supply of the educated workforce [24, 26]. On the
other side of the coin, the stable return to education despite a substantial rise in the supply
of skills implies a substantial rise in the demand for skills. During the 1991–2008 period
in Japan, the share of four-year and two-year college-graduate workers, respectively, rose
from 25.0 % to 36.4 % and from 5.1 % to 10.5 %, whereas the share of junior-high- and
11Lemieux [33] finds a positive correlation between the change in residual wage variance and the level of
education by occupation in the United States. We also examined this issue by plotting the change in the
residual variance along with education, experience, and tenure by occupation, but we found no evidence
that the residual variance increased more substantially in professions that require higher levels of skill and
training, such as analyst, doctor, engineer, and programmer.
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high-school-graduate workers, respectively, fell from 18.0 % to 5.3 % and from 51.9 % to
47.7 %.12 This phenomenon contrasts with the rising return to education and the stagnation
of higher education after the late 1970s in such Anglo-Saxon countries as Canada, the
United Kingdom, and the United States [5] but is similar to the stable or decreased return to
education and continuous progress in higher education in such other advanced East Asian
countries as the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan (see [27] for the Republic of
Korea, [40] for Singapore, and [12] for Taiwan).
4.2.2 Experience
The wage-experience profile is concave-shaped for every quantile. The slope of the wage-
experience profile is more moderate and the turning points are located earlier for lower
quantiles. Comparing the wage-experience profiles between 1991 and 2008, the return to
experience decreased for workers with 20 or more years of experience at the middle and
lower quantiles.13 The reduction in experience wage differentials is considered to be a
consequence of a relative increase in experienced workers caused by a decline in youth pop-
ulation size. The phenomenon mirrors a reduction in the relative wages of baby boomers
in the United States [43]. Two demographic changes underlie the decline in the share of
young and inexperienced workers in the Japanese labor market. First, the number of younger
cohorts entering the labor market decreased in recent years because of declining fertility
rates. Second, second-generation baby boomers, who were born in the early 1970s, reached
middle age.
4.2.3 Tenure
The wage-tenure profile is steeper than the wage-experience profile, indicating the impor-
tance of firm-specific human capital acquired through on-the-job training or the prevalence
of deferred compensation contracts in the Japanese labor market. In either case, seniority
wages firmly remain, as can be seen from a monotonic increase in wages up to 30 years
of job tenure for every quantile. From 1991 to 2008, however, the slope of the wage-tenure
profile decreased around 20 years of job tenure, especially for the upper quantile. The fluc-
12During the same period, for female full-time workers aged 15 to 59, the share of four-year and two-year
college-graduate (including vocational school-graduate) workers rose from 5.7 % to 18.5 % and from 20.0 %
to 31.8 % respectively, whereas the share of junior-high- and high-school-graduate workers respectively fell
from 16.0 % to 3.2 % and from 58.2 % to 46.5 %. The mean returns to two-year and four-year college
education for female workers gradually declined (from 4.5 % to 4.0 % and from 6.6 % to 5.8 %, respectively)
as a result of a rise in the share of female college-graduate workers. However, the effect on male returns to
human capital is theoretically ambiguous since male and female workers possess a different set of inherent
and acquired skills. There has been a significant reduction in gender differences in educational attainment in
the sense that nearly half of both male and female full-time workers had two-year or four-year college degrees
in 2008; however, an important difference remains, as evidenced by the fact that the share of male four-year
college-graduate workers was twice as large as that of their female counterparts in 2008. Furthermore, the
entry of young and educated female workers into the labor market caused a relative decrease in educated and
experienced male workers. Male returns to education and experience can increase or decrease as a result of a
rise in the share of female college-graduate workers.
13Hamaaki et al. [18] find a flattening of the earnings-age profile when not conditioning on tenure.
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tuation of the shares of groups whose tenure ranges from 1 to 5, from 6 to 10, and from 11
to 15 is attributable to the aging of second-generation baby boomers. A fall in job tenure
has not yet clearly appeared, which is consistent with Kambayashi and Kato [22], who
find that long-term employmen has been stable, using the Employment Status Survey. The
decline in the slope of the wage-tenure profile can be explained by sluggish technological
change and the extension of the mandatory retirement age. As technological change slows,
the skills acquired on the job become obsolete more slowly, firms invest less in on-the-job
training, and the return to tenure would decline [36]. Alternatively, as the mandatory retire-
ment age is extended under the Elderly Employment Stabilization Law,14 the wage-tenure
profile would be flatter under a deferred compensation contract [6, 30].15
4.2.4 Bonus
Biannual bonuses are prevalent in Japanese firms; in 1991, for example, 92.2 % of work-
ers received bonuses. As shown by Hashimoto [14, 15], the return to specific training is
maximized under a flexible wage contract, if productivity is subject to macroeconomic
fluctuations and the costs of collective bargaining are low. In this context, the presence
of biannual bonuses helps firms to provide on-the-job training programs and workers
to develop corporate loyalty. Hashimoto [15] and Hart and Kawasaki [13] confirm with
aggregate data that the bonus ratio increases with tenure and varies with macroeconomic
conditions.
During a period of economic stagnation over the 1990s and 2000s, the proportion of
workers who received bonuses declined from 92.2 % to 83.8 %, and the ratio of bonuses
to regular wages declined from 28.6 % to 21.6 %. To deepen our understanding of how
these changes affect the return to tenure, we decompose the logarithm of total wages (w)
into the logarithm of regular wages and the bonus ratio as follows: w = ln r + ln(1 +
b/r), where r denotes regular wages per hour, and b denotes bonus per hour, and perform
separate quantile regressions of ln r and ln(1 + b/r) on education dummies and fourth-
order polynomials in experience and tenure for the 10th, 50th, and 90th quantiles. Figure 4
depicts predicted values of the log regular wages and the bonus ratio along with years of
education, experience, and tenure in 1991, 2000, and 2008, holding other attributes at their
means. The shapes of the wage-education profile and wage-experience profile are similar
between total wages and regular wages, but the wage-tenure profile is steeper for total wages
than for regular wages at every quantile (Fig. 4, Panel A), since the bonus-tenure profile is
steeper (Fig. 4, Panel B). We find that the bonus ratio increases with education and tenure,
but not experience, consistent with Hashimoto’s [14, 15] human capital theory, where the
bonus is considered a shared return to investment in firm-specific human capital. Comparing
the profiles between 1991 and 2008, the bonus ratio profile shifts downward at the lower
14The Elderly Employment Stabilization Law was enacted in 1986 to increase employment opportunities for
the elderly and was amended in 1994 to prohibit mandatory retirement under the age of 60. According to
the Survey on Employment Management between 1992 and 2004, the proportion of firms with a retirement
system ranged between 88.2 % and 96.8 %. Among firms with a retirement system, the proportion of firms
where the mandatory retirement age was 59 or under decreased from 23.4 % in 1992 to 0.7 % in 2004.
15A negative association between return to tenure and retirement age can also be explained by human capital
theory when the retirement age is endogenous. As technological change slows, older workers delay their
retirement because they have less need to update their skills [36].
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Fig. 4 Predicted profiles of log regular wages and the bonus ratio: 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles
quantile, whereas the regular wage profile shifts slightly upward, indicating that a reduction
in bonuses plays a major role in declining real wages in the 2000s. Moreover, both the slope
of the regular wage-tenure profile and the slope of the bonus-tenure profile are less steep
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for workers with long tenure in more recent years, indicating a reduction in the importance
of firm-specific human capital.16, 17
4.3 Changes in workforce composition and within-group inequality
As shown in Fig. 3, there has been a steady increase in the share of educated and experienced
workers in the Japanese labor market since the 1990s. If wages are more dispersed among
more educated and experienced workers, as the human capital model with heterogeneous
returns implies, such a change in the composition of the workforce would mechanically raise
within-group wage inequality in the entire labor market. To confirm the relation between
workforce composition and within-group inequality, Table 1 presents within-group variance
defined in Eq. 3 along with workforce share by education, experience, and tenure for the
years 1991, 2000, and 2008.
Table 1 shows that the share of college-graduate workers increased steadily at every level
of experience and tenure, and the share of experienced workers increased among college-
graduate workers. Moreover, for each given year, within-group variance is greater among
more educated (experienced) workers, even when comparing workers with the same experi-
ence (education) (Table 1, Panel A). The increase in within-group variance with an increase
in education and experience can be interpreted as a result of heterogeneous returns to general
human capital. Within-group variance does not differ greatly among workers with different
tenure for four-year college-graduate workers, while it is slightly greater among workers
with longer tenure for workers with a two-year college degree or less (Table 1, Panel B),
indicating that the return to tenure is not as heterogeneous as the returns to education and
experience. Since skills acquired on the job are more specific than skills acquired in school
and with experience, it seems plausible that the return to tenure is more homogeneous than
the returns to education and experience. We thus consider an increased share of educated and
experienced workers to be the main cause of composition effects on within-group inequality.
We present the estimates of the effects of changes in the composition of the workforce, as
well as the price of skill, on changes in between- and within-group inequality in Section 5.
4.4 Japanese employment practices
In this section, we discuss the relevance of changes in job turnover, promotion, and labor
unions to changes in the wage-tenure profile and within-group inequality.
16There is anecdotal evidence of a decline in the importance of age and tenure as determinants of regu-
lar wages. According to the General Survey on Working Conditions conducted by the Ministry of Health,
Labour, and Welfare, the proportion of firms considering age and tenure as key determinants of regular wages
decreased from 72.5 % to 56.6 % for managerial positions and from 79.0 % to 63.7 % for non-managerial
positions during the 2001–2009 period.
17Firms seem to reduce the rate of increase in total wages with respect to tenure by decreasing the bonus
ratio and introducing a wage system that is less dependent on tenure. Since 2000, there has been a significant
increase in the number of firms adopting wage systems that place a greater emphasis on performance. The
new pay schemes are referred to as shokumu-kyu¯ and yakuwari-kyu¯, as opposed to shokuno¯-kyu¯, which was
prevalent during the 1980s. According to the Survey on the Change of Japanese Personnel Systems conducted
for all listed firms by the Japan Productivity Center, the proportion of firms adopting the new schemes
increased from 21.1 % to 72.3 % for managerial positions and from 17.7 % to 56.7 % for non-managerial
positions during the 1999–2008 period.
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Table 1 Workforce composition and within-group inequality
Workforce share ( %) Within-group variance
1991 2000 2008 1991 2000 2008
Panel A: by education and experience
Junior high school
0–10 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.097 0.084 0.088
11–20 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.105 0.102 0.107
21–30 5.1 1.4 1.0 0.098 0.117 0.121
31+ 10.4 6.9 3.2 0.119 0.120 0.137
High school
0–10 14.1 11.0 8.1 0.063 0.062 0.079
11–20 12.7 13.2 13.5 0.083 0.080 0.095
21–30 15.2 12.3 12.7 0.108 0.107 0.123
31+ 9.8 14.0 13.4 0.153 0.138 0.155
Two-year college
0–10 2.5 4.0 3.3 0.052 0.054 0.069
11–20 1.4 2.7 4.2 0.090 0.079 0.094
21–30 0.8 1.6 2.0 0.141 0.122 0.134
31+ 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.191 0.145 0.186
Four-year college
0–10 10.1 11.0 11.3 0.072 0.069 0.086
11–20 8.4 9.7 11.8 0.135 0.130 0.152
21–30 5.0 7.3 9.1 0.158 0.169 0.202
31+ 1.6 2.5 4.3 0.218 0.211 0.242
Panel B: by education and tenure
Junior high school
0 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.104 0.090 0.088
1–5 3.5 1.9 1.4 0.104 0.106 0.111
6–15 4.3 2.4 1.3 0.106 0.105 0.117
16+ 9.0 5.0 2.3 0.116 0.128 0.146
High school
0 4.4 3.2 3.8 0.087 0.089 0.097
1–5 14.3 12.9 13.5 0.091 0.096 0.117
6–15 14.4 16.4 12.7 0.092 0.089 0.112
16+ 18.7 18.0 17.8 0.110 0.112 0.123
Two-year college
0 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.068 0.075 0.084
1–5 1.9 3.1 3.5 0.071 0.073 0.105
6–15 1.5 3.5 3.4 0.088 0.072 0.098
16+ 1.1 1.8 2.7 0.122 0.118 0.112
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Table 1 (continued)
Workforce share ( %) Within-group variance
1991 2000 2008 1991 2000 2008
Four-year college
0 1.8 1.9 2.9 0.134 0.150 0.153
1–5 7.5 8.3 10.7 0.106 0.123 0.163
6–15 8.7 11.0 10.7 0.117 0.114 0.146
16+ 7.1 9.4 12.2 0.133 0.132 0.155
Notes: Within-group variance is obtained from the year-by-year regression of log wages on education dum-
mies and fourth-order polynomials in experience and tenure. The number of workers in the sample is 770,414,
770,566, and 578,788 in the years 1991, 2000, and 2008, respectively
4.4.1 Job retention and turnover
The long-term employment relationship in Japan used to be referred to as lifetime employ-
ment, representing longer job tenure and higher retention rate than in other countries.18
Investment in firm-specific human capital is premised on the long-term employment rela-
tionship. Although we find no substantial change in the length of tenure, a possible change
in the distribution of unobserved ability by tenure could potentially explain the change in
the wage-tenure profile. Specifically, if there were a trend for workers with high ability
to switch their jobs for higher wages, the wage-tenure profile would be flatter. The wage
increase associated with job changes, however, became less likely during the period of eco-
nomic stagnation. Figure 5 illustrates percentage wage changes associated with job changes
over the life cycle in the years 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006.19 The declining pattern of wage
changes over the life cycle remains the same over time, and the life-cycle profile of wage
changes shifts downward relative to the 1991 level. There is thus no evidence that a decline
in the return to tenure results from an increase in job changes accompanied by a rise in
wages.
4.4.2 Promotion
The promotion system in Japan is represented by late selection [13]. Late selection promotes
the acquisition of firm-specific human capital, facilitates skill transfer from senior to junior
workers, and maintains strong competition among workers who enter the firm in the same
year, at the risk of job turnover by new and talented workers. Organizational changes that
facilitate early promotion could potentially weaken the effect of tenure on wages. No sub-
stantial change is observed, however, in the proportion of workers in managerial positions
18The average job tenure of male workers in Japan is the highest among the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries, while the average job tenure of female workers in Japan is
below the average [38]. The five-year retention rate of male workers in Japan is also the highest for all age
groups.
19In this figure, wage changes are estimated by interval regressions using repeated cross sections from the
Survey on Employment Trends in the years 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006, in which the Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare collects ordered categorical information about changes in the wages of job switchers.
The yearly sample size ranges between 14,400 and 15,300.
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Fig. 5 Percentage wage changes associated with job changes over the life cycle
or the speed of promotion.20 The change in seniority wages seems to be better described as
a gradual change in the wage scale for all workers rather than as a discontinuous change in
the promotional ladder for only some workers.21
4.4.3 Labor unions
Japanese labor unions are typically formed at the enterprise level. In most cases, both white-
and blue-collar workers join the same labor union under a union shop agreement. Indi-
vidual enterprise unions play a role in exchanging information between management and
employees and negotiating a mutually acceptable settlement on firm-specific working con-
ditions [13]. The labor-union density in Japan is just below the median among the OECD
countries [38].22 It is conceivable that Japanese unions could perform functions similar
20Proportions of division chiefs, section chiefs, subsection chiefs, other chiefs, and foremen, respectively,
changed only from 2.2 % to 2.4 %, from 5.1 % to 5.8 %, from 4.7 % to 4.9 %, from 4.9 % to 4.7 %, and
from 1.8 % to 1.5 % between 1991 and 2008 in firms with more than 100 regular employees for which
the information about job rank is available. The average job tenure (years of experience) of division chiefs,
section chiefs, subsection chiefs, other chiefs, and foreman, respectively, changed only negligibly, from 23.8
to 23.6 (29.3 to 29.7) years, from 20.8 to 21.2 (24.9 to 25.9) years, from 18.0 to 18.4 (21.5 to 22.5) years,
and from 20.3 to 20.9 (24.8 to 24.3) years between 1991 and 2008.
21The promotion of female workers has been uncommon despite an increase in average years of education
and the job tenure of full-time female workers (from 12.1 to 13.3 years and from 6.7 to 7.7 years between
1991 and 2008, respectively). The proportions of division chiefs, section chiefs, subsection chiefs, other
chiefs, and foremen, respectively, ranged from 0.05 % to 0.21 %, from 0.25 % to 0.87 %, from 0.64 % to
1.45 %, from 0.92 % to 1.58 %, and from 0.16 % to 0.23 % between 1991 and 2008. This suggests that an
increase in the share of female workers with higher education and longer tenure would have only limited
effects on the male wage-tenure profile.
22Collective bargaining has been decentralized in Japan. as well as the United States, since the 1980s, in
contrast to some European countries, where decentralization took place in the 1990s and 2000s [38].
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Fig. 6 Within-group inequality (variance of residual log wages) and unionization rates by industry
to those performed by European and US unions in terms of reducing the wage dispersion
among unionized workers. We thus examine whether recent trends toward deunionization
can explain a rise in wage inequality. Figure 6 plots the level and change of within-group
variance and unionization rates by industry.23 Despite a large dispersion of unionization
rates, ranging from 9.9 % to 68.0 % in level and from –21.7 to 3.0 percentage points in
change, neither the level nor the change of residual variance varies so significantly by indus-
try. Deunionization does not seem to play a major role in increasing within-group inequality.
5 Results
5.1 Returns to human capital
Table 2 summarizes the GMM estimates of the means, variances, and covariances of het-
erogeneous returns to human capital with and without the restriction: σij = 0 for j, k =
a, b, c, d , and j = k in Eq. 5. Given the nonlinear relationship between human capital and
wages, the mean returns to education, experience, and tenure vary over years of education,
experience, and tenure, respectively.24 The estimated mean returns to education decreased
from 1991 to 2000 and increased from 2000 to 2008, while the return to high-school educa-
tion decreased steadily during this latter period. Comparing the estimates of the unrestricted
model in 1991 to those in 2008, the return to high-school education decreased by 0.50 per-
centage point (8.5 %), the return to two-year college education remained almost unchanged,
and the return to four-year college education increased by 0.22 percentage point (2.8 %).
The mean return to experience increased slightly for workers with 10 years of experience
and decreased steadily for workers with 30 years of experience from 1991 to 2008. The
mean return to tenure changed in a complicated way, but it decreased steadily for workers
23The unionization rates are from the Basic Survey on Labour Unions.
24Almost all coefficients for higher-order terms are precisely estimated.
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Table 2 GMM estimates of heterogeneous returns to human capital
Restricted model Unrestricted model
Returns to human capital Returns to human capital
1991 2000 2008 1991 2000 2008
Mean
Education
high school 0.0616 0.0584 0.0539 0.0587 0.0550 0.0537
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009)
two-year college 0.0623 0.0585 0.0609 0.0603 0.0574 0.0599
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
four-year college 0.0796 0.0762 0.0805 0.0783 0.0749 0.0805
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Experience
10 years 0.0201 0.0216 0.0221 0.0208 0.0217 0.0220
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
20 years 0.0086 0.0065 0.0053 0.0091 0.0068 0.0076
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
30 years −0.0018 −0.0033 −0.0053 −0.0028 −0.0032 −0.0046
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Tenure
5 years 0.0338 0.0356 0.0297 0.0330 0.0342 0.0292
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
10 years 0.0243 0.0187 0.0232 0.0236 0.0189 0.0222
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
20 years 0.0269 0.0227 0.0217 0.0265 0.0229 0.0209
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Variance
intercept 0.0009 0.0022
(0.0000) (0.0005)
education 0.0946 0.3102
(0.0025) (0.0098)
experience 0.3442 0.8501
(0.0049) (0.0314)
tenure 0.0097 0.1818
(0.0013) (0.0047)
Covariance
intercept, education −0.0197
(0.0007)
intercept, experience −0.0226
(0.0012)
intercept, tenure 0.0093
(0.0009)
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Table 2 (continued)
Restricted model Unrestricted model
Returns to human capital Returns to human capital
1991 2000 2008 1991 2000 2008
education, experience 0.3570
(0.0119)
education, tenure −0.1596
(0.0055)
experience, tenure −0.3056
(0.0151)
Notes: The sample size is 2,119,768. Standard errors are in parentheses. The base group for education
dummies is junior-high-school graduates
with 20 years of tenure. Changes in the returns to education, experience, and tenure across
the years 1991, 2000, and 2008 are all statistically significant with p-values of zero. The
pattern of the changes is broadly consistent with the results of the quantile regressions in
Section 4.2.25
The estimated variance of returns to human capital indicates a significant heterogeneity
in returns to human capital, while the estimated variance of the intercept is close to zero.
The extent of heterogeneity is greater in the returns to education and experience than in the
return to tenure, which presumably reflects the fact that skills acquired in school and with
experience are more general than skills acquired on the job. The estimated covariances of
returns to human capital are all individually, highly significant, indicating a strong rejection
of the null hypothesis that the covariance of returns to human capital is zero. The estimated
covariance between the intercept and slope coefficients is very small, but the estimated
covariance of returns to human capital is significant. The return to education moves in the
same direction as the return to experience, whereas the return to tenure moves inversely
with the returns to education and experience. These results seem plausible, since both edu-
cation and experience represent general human capital and tenure represents specific human
capital. The negative covariance of the returns to general and specific human capital would
reflect changes in the price of skill components in the labor market, such that the returns to
education and experience increased or did not decrease so much in sectors where the return
to tenure decreased significantly.
5.2 Price and composition effects
Narrowing inequality in the 1990s reflects a decline in between-group inequality, while
widening inequality in the 2000s reflects an increase in within-group inequality. Table 3
presents the results on the detailed decomposition of the changes in between- and within-
group inequality into price and composition effects. These effects are calculated from the
25Even when we split the sample into four age groups (aged 15–24, 25–34, 35–44, and 45–59 years) and
estimate the model wit = αit + sitβit + δit zit , where the regressors include education dummies (s) and a
linear term in tenure (z), we find a similar pattern of changes in the mean returns to education and tenure
for all age groups. Details of the results are presented in the Online Appendix.
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Table 3 Price and composition effects on between- and within-group inequality
Restricted model Unrestricted model
Between- Within- Between- Within-
group group group group
1991–2000 1991–2000
Price effects −0.0160 −0.0030 −0.0155 −0.0032
education −0.0019 −0.0010 −0.0018 −0.0014
experience −0.0028 −0.0020 −0.0029 −0.0007
tenure −0.0114 0.0000 −0.0108 −0.0011
intercept 0.0000 0.0000
Composition effects −0.0013 0.0048 −0.0014 0.0045
Total −0.0174 0.0017 −0.0169 0.0012
2000−2008 2000−2008
Price effects −0.0046 0.0085 −0.0039 0.0135
education 0.0058 0.0010 0.0060 0.0034
experience −0.0012 0.0082 0.0012 0.0062
tenure −0.0093 −0.0005 −0.0111 0.0039
intercept −0.0001 0.0000
Composition effects 0.0073 0.0142 0.0070 0.0099
Total 0.0026 0.0228 0.0031 0.0234
regression results with and without the restriction reported in Table 3. A decline in between-
group inequality in the 1990s is mostly attributable to price effects generated by decreased
returns to education, experience, and tenure. In particular, the decreased return to tenure
accounts for two thirds of the decline in between-group inequality. Within-group inequality
was stable in the 1990s, since negative price effects generated by the decreased return to
tenure countervailed positive composition effects. As the share of educated and experienced
workers continued to increase, the size of composition effects on within-group inequality
increased in the 2000s. The sign of price effects on within-group inequality changed from
negative to positive in the 2000s, while the size of price effects on between-group inequality
fell, as the return to college education started to increase moderately. Accordingly, within-
group inequality increased in the 2000s, while between-group inequality did not change
substantially.
The assumption of no correlation among heterogeneous returns understates price effects
on within-group inequality. When relaxing this assumption, an increase in the return to
education entails an increase in the return to experience (and vice versa), and a decrease
in the return to tenure entails an increase in returns to education and experience (and vice
versa). The relative size of price and composition effects on within-group inequality in the
1990s does not change substantially regardless of the restriction, while that in the 2000s is
greater in the absence of the restriction. Nonetheless, composition effects still account for a
significant part of the increase in within-group inequality in the 2000s.
To summarize, a decline in between-group inequality, which accounts for narrowing
inequality in the 1990s, resulted from decreased returns to human capital, especially firm-
specific human capital, while an increase in within-group inequality, which accounts for
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widening inequality in the 2000s, resulted from changes in workforce composition, as
well as changes in returns to human capital. Even when we allow for more complex price
effects, a significant fraction of the increase in within-group inequality is still attributable
to composition effects arising from the increased share of educated and experienced
workers.
5.3 Robustness checks
We end our analysis by examining the robustness of the decomposition results for changes
in industry composition, firm-size distribution, and the proportion of part-time employment.
5.3.1 Industry and firm size
The share of workers in the manufacturing sector decreased from 36.8 % to 31.5 % between
1991 and 2008 because of globalization and outsourcing, while the share of workers in ser-
vice and other sectors, respectively, increased from 2.6 % to 7.1 % and from 22.9 % to
26.6 %. There is no clear trend for the distribution of firm size, but the share of workers
in large firms with more than 5,000 employees decreased until 2004 and then increased.
Hashimoto and Raisian [16, 17], Mincer and Higuchi [36] and Clark and Ogawa [6], among
others, discuss a difference in wage profiles by firm size and industry. In light of these stud-
ies, changes in industry composition and firm-size distribution might account for changes
in wage profiles and have an implication for trends in wage inequality. We thus examine
this possibility by re-weighting all observations so as to hold the distribution of industries
and firm size fixed at the 1991 level. Let q denote a set of 15 dummy variables for indus-
tries and seven dummy variables for firm size and τ0 the reference year 1991.26 Following
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux [8], the re-weighting factor is given by
ψτ(q) = Pr ( q| t = τ0)Pr ( q| t = τ) =
Pr ( t = τ0| q)
/
Pr (t = τ0)
Pr ( t = τ | q)/ Pr (t = τ) , (7)
where the conditional probabilities are nonparametrically estimated.
The first two columns of Table 4 present the decomposition results without the restriction
when the distribution of industries and firm size is held fixed at the 1991 level. Comparing
the changes in overall inequality, i.e., the sum of between- and within-group inequality,
in the first two columns of Table 4 to those in the last two columns of Table 4, we find
that the change in overall inequality between 1991 and 2000 would be greater by 15.9 %
if there were no change in the distribution of industries and firm size, while changes in
the distribution of industries and firm size account for 23.3 % of the changes in overall
inequality between 2000 and 2008. The main results described above concerning price and
composition effects on between- and within-group inequality remain essentially unchanged,
however, even after controlling for industry composition and firm-size distribution.
26The classification of industries is based on the Japan Standard Industry Classification as follows: (a)
mining; (b) construction; (c) manufacturing; (d) electricity, gas, and water; (e) information and telecommu-
nication; (f) transport; (g) wholesale and retailing; (h) finance and insurance; (i) real estate and rental; (j)
professional; (k) hotel and restaurant; (l) entertainment and daily life-related services; (m) education; (n)
medical care and welfare; (o) complex services; and (p) service. Firm size is classified according to the num-
ber of employees as follows: (a) 5000+, (b) 1000–4999, (c) 500–999, (d) 300–499, (e) 100–299, (f) 30–99,
(g) 10–29, and (h) 5–9.
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Table 4 Decomposition results when controlling for the distribution of industries and firm size and selection
into full-time employment
Industries & firm size Full-time employment
Between- Within- Between- Within-
group group group group
1991–2000 1991–2000
Price effects −0.0174 −0.0024 −0.0126 −0.0023
education −0.0014 −0.0014 −0.0019 −0.0015
experience −0.0048 −0.0002 −0.0019 0.0006
tenure −0.0112 −0.0008 −0.0088 −0.0012
intercept −0.0000 −0.0002
Composition effects −0.0037 0.0053 −0.0046 0.0039
Total −0.0211 0.0029 −0.0172 0.0016
2000−2008 2000−2008
Price effects −0.0045 0.0062 0.0023 0.0135
education 0.0042 0.0022 0.0063 0.0037
experience −0.0027 0.0012 0.0004 0.0073
tenure −0.0060 0.0026 −0.0044 0.0026
intercept 0.0003 −0.0000
Composition effects 0.0060 0.0126 0.0008 0.0094
Total 0.0015 0.0188 0.0031 0.0229
5.3.2 Part-time employment
The proportion of part-time workers increased steadily from 1.3 % to 8.5 % between 1991
and 2008. Part-time workers serve as a buffer against economic stagnation, whereas the
employment of regular workers is stringently protected in Japan compared with other OECD
countries [38]. Part-time workers are typically not entitled to bonuses, fringe benefits, or
training programs. In fact, the proportion of workers who received bonuses in 2008 is only
13.2 % for part-time workers, as compared to 83.8 % for full-time workers. A change
in the composition of full-time workers induced by the increase in part-time employment
might also account for changes in wage profiles. To control for selection into full-time
employment, we employ the Heckman sample-selection method [20]. The estimation pro-
cess consists of two steps. First, the selection-correction term (the inverse Mills ratio) is
obtained from the probit regression of full-time employment on fourth-order polynomials in
age and tenure, cohort-prefecture-specific part-time employment rates, and prefectural dum-
mies, using the sample of full- and part-time workers for each year. Second, after including
the selection-correction term as an additional regressor into Eq. 4, the system GMM esti-
mation is performed on the sample of full-time workers. We allow the coefficient on the
selection-correction term to vary over time, but not across individuals. The estimated coef-
ficients on the selection-correction terms are then 0.47, 0.26, and 0.25, with standard errors
of 0.02, 0.01, and 0.01 in 1991, 2000, and 2008, respectively. These results indicate that
male workers were positively selected into full-time employment, but the degree of the
selection decreased with a rise in part-time employment over time. We find a similar pattern
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of changes in returns to human capital, even after controlling for selection into full-time
employment.27
The last two columns of Table 4 present the decomposition results without the restriction
when controlling for selection into full-time employment. Comparing the changes in overall
inequality in the last two columns of Table 4 to those in the last two columns of Table 3,
we find that the selection effect accounts for virtually nothing of the changes in overall
inequality between 1991 and 2000 and only 1.9 % of the changes in overall inequality
between 2000 and 2008. Moreover, the main results described above remain essentially
unchanged.
6 Conclusion
This paper has documented and discussed the changing and unchanged nature of Japan’s
wage structure over the 1990s and 2000s. We have shown that trends in Japan’s wage
inequality over the past two decades can be well understood in terms of changes in returns to
human capital and the composition of the workforce, along the lines of human capital theory,
when allowing for heterogeneous returns to human capital and incorporating firm-specific
human capital. We found that, for full-time male workers, wage inequality declined in the
1990s along with a decrease in between-group inequality, while it increased in the 2000s
along with an increase in within-group inequality. The decline in between-group inequality
in the 1990s resulted from decreased returns to human capital. In particular, the decreased
return to firm-specific human capital, which appears in both regular wages and biannual
bonuses, accounted for two thirds of the decline in between-group inequality. While changes
in returns to human capital contributed to widening within-group inequality in the 2000s, a
significant fraction of the increase in within-group inequality in the 2000s is attributable to
composition effects arising from the increased share of educated and experienced workers.
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